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Abstract
This chapter describes an innovative modeling and simulation approach using newly
proposed Advanced Game-based Mathematical Framework (AGMF), Unified Game-based
Acquisition Framework (UGAF) and a set of War-Gaming Engines (WGEs) to address
future space systems acquisition challenges. Its objective is to assist the DoD Acquisition
Authority (DAA) to understand the contractor’s perspective and to seek optimum
Program-and-Technical-Baseline (PTB) solution and corresponding acquisition strategy
under both the perspectives of the government and the contractors. The proposed approach
calls for an interdisciplinary research that involves game theory, probability and statistics,
and non-linear programming. The goal of this chapter is to apply the proposed war-gaming
frameworks to develop and evaluate PTB solutions and associated acquisition strategies in
the context of acquisition of future space systems. Our simulation results suggest that our
optimization problem for the acquisition of future space systemsmeets the affordability and
innovative requirements with minimum acquisition risk.
Keywords: game theory, probability and statistics, non-linear programming, mathematical
modeling, simulation, Program and Technical Baseline, acquisition strategy, space systems
1. Introduction
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has recently released the Defense Innovation Initiative
(DII) with the goal to “reinvigorate war-gaming” and to make DoD (best) practices more
innovative [1]. In addition, DoD and U.S. Air Force have generated new acquisition regula-
tions and initiatives to promote “Owning the Technical Baseline” (OTB) and “modular open
system approach (MOSA)” as enablers for affordability [2, 3]. The Aerospace Corporation has
been investigating and developing war-gaming techniques to improve the DoD acquisition
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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efficiency and productivity by using AGMF-UGAF to generate optimum PTB solutions and
associated optimum acquisition strategies for future space systems [4–9]. The goal is to provide
a set of decision support tools that can be used by the DoD Acquisition Authority (DAA) to
make joined acquisition-and-programmatic decisions that will avoid acquiring the “mission
area stovepipe” space systems in the future. Although the focus of this chapter is on the future
space systems, but the models presented in this chapter can be adapted and used for general
civil and commercial systems with minor modifications.
The UGAF-AGMF [4, 7] describes two levels of War-Gaming Engines (WGEs) or game models,
namely, one representing the government’s “Acquisition” perspective, and the other representing
the contractor’s “Bidding” perspective. The multivariate optimization involves the government
objective to maximize performance and minimize cost for “affordability,” and the contractor
objective to maximize performance and maximize profits. The framework establishes government
models (DAA-WGE) and contractor models (KTR-WGE). Each of these WGEs is further
subdivided into PTB (P) solution models and corresponding Acquisition (A)/Bidding (B) strategy
models; government models are abbreviated as DAA-PWGE and DAA-AWGE; contractor models
are KTR-PWGE and KTR-BWGE. These proposed frameworks and associated game models
address technical baseline, contract type, associated incentives, source selection criteria described
in Sections L & M of a Request for Proposal (RFP) [10].
The chapter discusses AGMF that utilizes static and dynamic games and associated WGEs that
employ Bayesian cooperative and non-cooperative games with both complete and incomplete
information scenarios, and the use of UGAF for employing appropriate WGEs and solving
conflicting system and acquisition requirements. In addition, this chapter also presents and
discusses simulation results obtained from the proposed DAA-PWGE, DAA-AWGE, KTR-
PWGE and KTR-BWGE. The Chapter is organized as follow:
• Section 2 presents the “Acquisition War-Gaming Concept” and discusses the “Art versus
Science” for the development of the AGMF and UGAF frameworks;
• Section 3 provides a detailed description of AGMF; Section 4 discusses the UGAF;
• Section 5 describes the PTB-WGEs or PWGEs including DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE;
• Section 6 describes and discusses the government “Acquisition” DAA-AWGEs and con-
tractor “Bidding” KTR-AWGE for commonly used contract types, including Firmed-Fixed
Price (FFP), Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF), and Cost Plus Incentive Firm (CPIF);
• Section 7 presents the MATLAB models1 and simulation results obtained from the DAA-
PWGE, DAA-AWGE, KTR-PWGE and KTR-BWGE models for commonly used contract
types discussed above.
• Section 8 provides a brief discussion on the integration of PWGEs and AWGEs. Note that
the optimum PTB solution will be selected by integrating the DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE,
1
The MATLAB models presented in this chapter were implemented by a Nationally-Diverse Student Team (NDST) under
the support of the National Science Foundation (NSF), Grant Number DMS-1461148, through the NCSU Industrial and
Applied Mathematics Research Experience for Undergraduates (REU) Project. Note that the NDST is also referred to as
the REU team.
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while the optimum acquisition strategy is selected by integrating the DAA-AWGE and
KTR-AWGE.
• Finally, Section 9 presents the conclusion and discusses way-forward.
2. Acquisition War-Gaming Concept: Art versus Science
Our proposed “Acquisition War-Gaming” frameworks leverage existing war-gaming concept,
which is defined as a step-by-step process of action, reaction, and counteraction for visualizing
the execution of each friendly Course-Of-Action (COA) in relation to an enemy’s COA and
reactions. In the war-gaming process, planners determine how to apply combat multipliers to
the COA to improve the possibility of mission success and minimize risks to soldiers. “Acqui-
sition War-Gaming” employs “Game Theory” in the “war-gaming” concept to optimize (i) the
Program and Technical Baseline (PTB) solution for a set of warfighter requirements, and (ii)
associated acquisition strategy and contract incentives for acquiring the “PTB solution.” The
optimization games require “Payoff and Cost Functions” or PCFs and associated “Objective
Function.” The readers can find detailed description of PTB and its components in Refs. [4–6].
As discussed in Ref. [7], we envision two categories of War-Gaming Engines (WGE2), namely,
DAAWar-Gaming Engine (DAA-WGE) and Contractor-WGE (KTR-WGE). Figure 1 depicts our
vision for the two categories of war-gaming applications [7]. DAA-WGE is to be played by DAA
and its stakeholders (see Figure 1(a)). KTR-WGE is to be played by potential contractors
(or organizations posing as contractors), with game rules dictated by DAA and its stakeholders
(see Figure 1(b)). The DAA-WGE and KTR-WGE will be developed and integrated such that
DAA and its stakeholders can use them for the development and generation of optimum PTB
solutions and associated acquisition strategy, respectively. Note that the optimum acquisition
strategy addresses contract type, associated incentives, and RFP and source selection criteria. To
achieve this goal, we define and develop the following four types of game models:
• DAA-PWGE: government plays the game to select optimum PTB solutions. Past acquisi-
tion data and market survey data are used to characterize each contractor’s bidding
behavior. A PTB solution is selected based on minimum program execution risk and cost.
• DAA-AWGE: government plays the game to select an optimum acquisition strategy
associated with a PTB solution. Past acquisition data and market survey data are used to
characterize each contractor’s bidding behavior. An acquisition strategy is selected based
on minimum program execution risk and cost.
• KTR-PWGE: in this game, we simulate the contractors as players and the goal is to select
optimum contractors’ PTB solutions. Past acquisition data and market survey data are used
to characterize each contractor’s bidding behavior. A PTB solution is selected for each
contractor based on minimum program execution risk and maximum contractor profit.
2
WGE is defined a set of Algorithms, characterizing the Program and Technical Baseline (PTB), technology enablers,
architectural solutions, contracting parameters, and industry bidding position, implemented in MATLAB statistical
optimization models.
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• KTR-BWGE: this game also is referred to as KTR-AWGE because the contractor’s bidding
strategy will be derived based on the acquisition strategy specified by the government or
DAA-AWGE. The KTR-AWGE game simulates the contractors as players and the goal is
to select the optimum bidding strategy associated with each contractor’s selected PTB
solution. Past acquisition data and market survey data are used to characterize each
contractor’s bidding behavior. A bidding strategy is selected based on minimum program
execution risk and maximum contractor profit.
To integrate these War-Gaming Engines together, we need a unified framework that can
achieve the vision shown in Figure 1. The proposed unified framework described in Ref. [7]
consists of two frameworks, namely, AGMF and UGAF. The development of AGMF frame-
work to apply war-gaming concept for “Acquisition” is a “Science.” The AGMF is a framework
for selecting optimum game structure and game type depending on the information available
for PTB Action Space (PAS) and Acquisition Action Space (AAS). On the other hand, the
development of UGAF for “Exercising” AGMF is an “Art.” UGAF is used for the exercising of
the AGMF to generate optimum PTB solutions and optimum acquisition strategies. The over-
view of these unified frameworks will be provided in the following sections.
3. Advanced Game-based Mathematical Framework (AGMF)
Figure 2 describes the framework where it captures the Bayesian game structures and seven
game types (game selection from #1 through #7) for DAA-PWGE, DAA-AWGE, KTR-PWGE
Figure 1. Our vision for war-gaming applications [7].
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and KTR-AWGE depending on the information available for PAS and AAS [7]. As shown in
Figure 2, the framework starts the game selection by answering a question concerning the
player’s ability to observe other player action. As depicted in Figure 2, the DAA-PWGE and
DAA-AWGE always have the static game structure since all the games will be played by
the DAA and its stakeholders, with contractors as players in each game. On the other hand,
the KTR-PWGE and KTR-AWGE can have either static game or dynamic game structure. The
KTR-PWGE and KTR-AWGE can have a dynamic game structure when the DAA and its
stakeholders assume that the one contractor can observe other contractor’s action when the
games are played. For dynamic game structure, the players make move based on the informa-
tion released from the RFP and the players’ ability (or contractor’s ability) to observe other
players’ action through the “intelligent” information gathered on the competitors. A detailed
discussion of AGMF is provided in Ref. [7].
4. Unified Game-based Acquisition Framework (UGAF)
The goal for UAGF is two-fold, namely, (i) play games to determine optimum PTB solution for
a specified set of warfighter needs, and (ii) play games to determine the corresponding opti-
mum acquisition strategy for a specified optimum PTB solution [7]. The optimum PTB solution
Figure 2. AGMF: selection of optimum war-gaming structure and type [7].
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is defined as the “Architecture Solution3” (ARCS) for the required warfighter needs that meets
the affordability and innovative requirements with minimum acquisition risk. Figure 3 describes
our proposed unified framework to exercise the AGMF. It describes the processing flow for the
DAA-PWGE, DAA-AWGE, KTR-PWGE and KTR-AWGE to generate optimum PTB solutions
and associated optimum acquisition strategies. Figure 3 also shows seven processing boxes, in
the order of execution. Detailed descriptions of Boxes #1 through #7 are described in Ref. [7].
5. PTB War-Gaming Engines (PWGEs)
This section provides an overview of DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE models. The approach
presented in this section follows [8]. It focuses on static Bayesian game models with “Pure”
and “Mixed” games depending on the outcomes of the market survey results. For a pure game
with complete and perfect information, the contractors are “surer” of their risk assessments on
the selected TEs. The risk is either “Good” or “Bad” with probability of 1 and the “Belief” and/
or “Weighting” functions for this game type are not needed. For mixed games with complete
and imperfect information, the contractors are “more uncertain” of their risk assessments on
TEs and the “Belief” and/or “Weighting” functions are needed for assessing TE risks. In this
case, the TEs are weighted based on their priorities and using a probability density function
with either uniform or triangular distribution depending on the TE’s uncertainty.
Figure 3. UGAF: a unified approach for exercising AGMF [7].
3
Architecture solution or ARCS is descried in terms of a set of selected “Technology Enablers” (TEs) that can provide the
required system capabilities, which meet the warfighter needs. TE is a specific technology solution that meets a “capabil-
ity” alone or in combination with other TEs, e.g. a telemetry communications system.
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The TE’s uncertainties are expressed in terms technology and market uncertainties. The defi-
nition for the system requirement types and associated PTB solution framework for classifying
a PTB Solution are described in Figure 4 [8]. As an example, a Type 1 Requirement is mapped
into a “Less Innovative & Conservative PTB Solution” where the “Market Uncertainty” and
“Technology Uncertainty” are “Low” and “Low,” respectively. Since each “Requirement Type”
is associated with specific measure of technology and market uncertainties, the proposed PTB
solution framework allows us to select the appropriate acquisition strategy for each “Require-
ment Type” and assess the technology and cost risk for each “PTB Solution Type.” Figure 5
provides a PTB mapping framework to identify the “Acquisition Strategy” and risks associated
with each “Requirement Type” and “PTB Solution.”
A detailed description of PTB System Engineering (SE) frameworks, the analytical and simu-
lation modeling approaches for developing optimum PTB solutions can be found in Ref. [8].
5.1. Analytical and simulation modeling approach for government PTB games
This section provides an overview description of the analytical and simulation modeling
approaches for PTB cooperative Bayesian games for complete information with pure and
mixed strategies [8].
5.1.1. DAA-PWGE cooperative Bayesian games set-up for complete information with pure and
mixed strategies
The DAA plays static Bayesian cooperative games with either complete and perfect informa-
tion (pure game) or complete and imperfect information (mixed game) using normal-form
Figure 4. PTB framework for classifying PTB solution according to requirement uncertainties.
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representation of the Bayesian games [8]. Our game models assume “N” suppliers (or contrac-
tors (KTRs)) participating in the bidding games and the availability of market survey data for
which Government’s “request for information” (RFI) is used to collect the required data from
each contractor for assessing potential TEs identified by DAA. The contractor set is defined
mathematically as
KTR ¼ KTRn; n ¼ 1; 2;…;Nf g (1)
The DAA defines PTB strategies involving potential architecture solutions and make them
available to each supplier through RFI. The DAA estimates payoff received by each supplier
for each combination of PTB strategies that could be chosen by the suppliers. The potential “I”
architecture solutions set or ARCS is defined mathematically as
ARCS ¼ ARCSi; n ¼ 1; 2;…; If g (2)
The DAA plays complete-Bayesian game with a “Pure” or “Mixed” strategy, depending on the
market survey data, to select the optimum PTB solution that can achieve “Nash” equilibrium.
“Pure” game will be played if the market survey data show “complete and perfect informa-
tion” for TEs. On the other hand, “Mixed” game will be played when the data show “complete
and imperfect information.” A “Pure” strategy, SPure, is a strategy for a contractor “k” to map
an architecture solution “i” to a PTB solution “j” defined as
SPure ¼ S
k
i, j : ARCS
k
i ! PTB
k
j ; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
n o
(3)
A “Mixed” strategy, SMixed, is a strategy for a contractor “k” to map an architecture solution “i”
to a PTB solution “j” with a “Belief” function Pki, j defined as
Figure 5. PTB mapping framework: requirement type-acquisition strategy mapping [7].
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SMixed ¼ S
k
i, j : ARCS
k
i !
Pki, j
PTBkj ; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
( )
(4)
The “Belief” function set or “Conditional” probability set P is defined as “the probability of
selecting a PTB solution type “j” given an architecture solution “i””
P ¼ Pki, j; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
n o
(5)
The “Belief” function Pki, j must satisfy the following conditions
0 ≤Pki, j ≤ 1 and
XI
i¼1
Pki, j ¼ 1 (6)
Note that the ARCS-PTB mapping rules are based on the “Requirement Type” that is given in
Figure 5. The PTB “Utility” set for a “Pure Strategy,” UPure, is defined as the Payoff and Cost
Function (PCF) for selecting a pure strategy Ski, for each contractor “k,”which can be expressed
mathematically as:
UPure ¼ U
k
i, j : S
k
i, j ! PCF
k
i, j; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
n o
(7)
Similarly, the PTB “Utility” set for a “Mixed” strategy, UMixed, is defined as the PCF for
selecting a mixed strategy Ski, j for each contractor “k” with a “Belief” function P
k
i, j is defined as
follow:
UMixed ¼ U
k
i, j : S
k
i, j!
Pki, j
PCFki, j; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
( )
(8)
A notional description of PCF, PCFki, j, and PCF scoring
4 approach are provided in Ref. [8].
5.1.2. DAA-PWGE cooperative game with complete information and pure strategy
DAA plays the DAA-PWGE “Pure Strategy” games to “Minimize” the Cost and “Maximize”
the Payoff (e.g., performance) for the selected optimum strategy, SOpt. Mathematically, DAA
plays the following DAA-PTB “Pure” strategy Bayesian games
4
Ref. [9] describes the PCF scoring approach based on seven DOD initiatives including Initiative (i): “Proposed Technical
Requirements and Associated TEs Incorporated Industry’s Input”; Initiative (ii): “Should Cost Data Available for Each
TE”; Initiative (iii): “Should Cost Data Available for Overall System”; Initiative (iv): “Leverage DOD IRAD to Lower
Cost”; Initiative (v): “Leverage Contractor’s IRAD to Lower Cost”; Initiative (vi): “Provide Incentives to Allow Contractor
to Make IRAD an Allowable Cost”; and Initiative (vii): “Leverage MOSA for Architecture Design Solution.” The higher
the PCF score, the better PTB solution is.
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Optimum PTB Solution  SOpt ¼
MinMax
∀i, j, k
Uki, j : S
k
i, j ! PCF
k
i, j
n o
(9)
Where Ski, j is defined as in Eq. (3) and U
k
i, j is given by Eq. (7). This is the “MinMax” optimiza-
tion problem to search for SOpt such that, assuming that the ARCSi is the optimum solution
with PTB Type 1 solution:
SOpt ¼ U
k
i,1 > U
k
i,2 > U
k
i,3 > U
k
i,4 > U
k
i,5; for ∀i and ∀k
n o
(10)
The above optimum solution is said to achieve the Nash equilibrium, which is a stable solution
to this game theoretic problem in which no individual contractor can improve their payoff by a
unilateral change in his bidding behavior. The DAA-PWGE pure game algorithm is shown in
Figure 6 with details provided in Ref. [8].
5.1.3. DAA-PWGE cooperative game with complete information and mixed strategy
Similar to the “Pure” strategy, DAA plays the DAA-PWGE “Mixed Strategy” games to “Mini-
mize” the Cost and “Maximize” the Payoff. Mathematically, DAA plays the following DAA-PTB
“Mixed” Strategy Bayesian games:
Optimum PTB Solution  SOptMixed ¼
MinMax
∀i, j, k
Uki, j : S
k
i, j!
Pki, j
PCFki, j; i ¼ 1; ::; I; j ¼ 1; ::5; k ¼ 1; ::;N
( )
(11)
Where Ski, j is defined as in Eq. (4), U
k
i, j is given by Eq. (8) and the “Belief” function P
k
i, j is given by
Eq. (5). Again, this is the “MinMax” optimization problem that reaches the “Nash equilibrium”
Figure 6. Description of DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE algorithms.
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when SOptMixed satisfies the following condition, assuming that ARCSi is the optimum solution
with PTB Type 1 solution:
SOptMixed ¼ U
k
i,1 > U
k
i,2 > U
k
i,3 > U
k
i,4 > U
k
i,5; for ∀i and ∀k
n o
(12)
The DAA Plays the DAA-PTB “Mixed Strategy” games to maximize the payoff for the selected
optimum strategy SOptMixed resulting from the optimally mapping an ARCS to a PTB Solution for a
given set of “Belief Function Pki, j” defined in Eq. (5). The conditional probability that the k
th
supplier/contractor (KTR) selects the lth TE with a weighting factor of Wl for the i
th architecture
solution, ARCSi, given that the ARCSi is mapped to PTB Type “j” is defined as:
Prki, j, l ¼W l:PrTE
k
i, j, l (13)
where
PrTEki, j, l ¼ Pr KTR
}k} Selects TEkl forARCSi=KTR}k} maps ARCSi to PTB Type} j}
n o
(14)
The “Belief Function” set “P” for all architecture solutions, i = 1, 2,…, I, can be calculated using
the following equation:
Pki, j ¼
XL
l¼1
W l:PrTE
k
i, j, l (15)
Note that our team5 has recently found that the above equation provides a better mathematical
model than the one described in Ref. [8] for the belief function. Since each TE will have its own
“Technology Risk” and “Market Risk”,6 Eq. (15) becomes:
Pk_Tech1, j ¼
XL
l¼1
W l:PrTE
k_Tech
i, j, l (16)
Pk_Market1, j ¼
XL
l¼1
W l:PrTE
k_Market
i, j, l (17)
Pk_Techi, j and P
k_Market
i, j must satisfy the following conditions:
0 ≤Pk_Techi, j ≤ 1 and
X6
i¼1
Pk_Techi, j ¼ 1, for ∀k (18)
0 ≤Pk_Marketi, j ≤ 1 and
X6
i¼1
PkMarketi, j ¼ 1, for ∀k (19)
5
Our team for the FY 2017 includes the REU team funded by NSF with the following selected undergraduate students:
Brittany Dyer, Claire Goldhammer, Daniel Chertock and Scott Mahan. The 2017 REU team also includes Amanda Coons,
a graduate assistant, and Prof. Hien Tran, a NCSU faculty advisor.
6
Note that the terms “Technology Risk/Market Risk” and “Technology Uncertainty/Market Uncertainty” are used inter-
changeably in this chapter.
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Adetailed description of the calculation approach for the belief function is provided in Ref. [8]. The
DAA-PWGEmixed game algorithm is shown in Figure 6with the details provided in Ref. [8]. The
calculationapproachdescribed inRef. [8] shouldbemodifiedas shown inEq. (15). ThePTB tracking
tool described in Ref. [6] will be used to capture the PTB solution captured by theDAA-PWGE.
5.2. Analytical and simulation modeling approach for contractor PTB games
For KTR-PWGE model, the DAA plays game on behalf of the contractors [8]. Similar to DAA-
PWGE, the KTR, actually played by DAA, plays the static Bayesian “Non-Cooperative” (NC)
games with complete and imperfect information or mixed game using normal-form representa-
tion of the game. The game is NC because it is assumed that the contractors do not share their
bidding information. The KTR plays game to select optimum PTB solution that can maximize
profits and reduce execution risks. The KTR is assumed to play games to search for an optimum
PTB solution that can achieve the “Nash” equilibrium. The KTR game is set-up as follows:
• Step 1: contractor set: assume to have N contractors to play the game (see Eq. (1)).
• Step 2: contractor identifies a set of potential “I” architecture solution ARCSNC based on
the requirements described in the release of RFI or RFP from a government agency:
ARCSNC ¼ ARCSNC_i; n ¼ 1; 2;…; If g (20)
• Step 3: each architecture solution selected by a KTR will be mapped into a unique PTB
solution type defined by DAA.
• Step 4: the Non-Cooperative (NC) game with mixed strategy and incomplete information:
The strategy for the kth contractor to map the ith architecture solution to the jth PTB
solution type is performed using the following mathematical expression:
SMixed_Non_Coop ¼ S
k
NC_i, j : ARCS
k
NC_i !
PkNC_i, j
PTBkNC_j; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
( )
(21)
• Step 5: The “Belief Function” set or conditional probability set “P” for NC games: For each
contractor “k”, the belief function “PNonCoop” is defined as the probability of selecting a
PTB solution type “j” given the ith architecture solution:
PNonCoop ¼ P
k
NCi, j
; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
n o
(22)
where PkNCi, j is defined as:
PkNCi, j ¼
XL
l¼1
WNCl :PrTE
k
NCi, j, l
¼
PkTechNCi, j ¼
XL
l¼1
WNCl :PrTE
kTech
NCi, j, l
PkMarketNCi, j ¼
XL
l¼1
WNCl :PrTE
kMarket
NCi, j, l
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
(23)
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Similar to theDAAgames, the above equation provides a bettermathematicalmodel than the one
described in Ref. [8] for contractor games, and Eq. (22)must also satisfy the following condition:
0 ≤PkNCi, j ≤ 1 and
XI
i¼1
PkNCi, j ¼ 1 (24)
• Step 6: PTB Utility Set for a “NC Mixed Strategy” is defined as UMixed_Non_Coop. This is the
PCFNC for selecting a mixed strategy S
k
i, j for the k
th contractor. Mathematical, it is given by
the following equation:
UMixed_Non_Coop ¼ U
k
NC_i, j : S
k
NC_i, j !
PkNC_i, j
PCFkNC_i, j; i ¼ 1; 2;…I; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; k ¼ 1; 2;…;N
( )
(25)
• Step 7: The KTR plays the following mixed game to select the optimum PTB solution:
KTR Optimum PTB Solution ¼ SOpt_KTR ¼
Max
∀i, j, k
UkNC_i, j : S
k
NC_i, j !
PkNC_i, j
PCFkNC_i, j
( )
(26)
Similar to DAA-PWGE, the contractor plays KTR-PWGE to maximize his payoff or “Profit” for
the selected optimum strategy SOptKTR resulting from optimally mapping an ARCS to a PTB
Solution for a given set of belief function “PNonCoop.” The detailed KTR-PWGE mixed game
algorithm is shown in Figure 6with details provided in Ref. [8]. The PTB tracking tool described
in Ref. [6] will be used to capture the PTB solution captured by the KTR-PWGE.
6. Acquisition-bidding War-Gaming Engines (AWGEs)
The approach for the development of Acquisition-bidding WGEs presented in this section
follows Ref. [9]. An overview description of the government “Acquisition” DAA-AWGEs and
contractor “Bidding” KTR-AWGEwill be presented in this section for commonly used contract
types, including Firmed-Fixed Price (FFP7) and Cost Plus Incentive Firm (CPIF). The Fixed
Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) contract type can be found in Ref. [9].
6.1. Acquisition-bidding WGE set-up
The acquisition-bidding game model assumes that there are N contractors participating in the
bidding of the space system with the contractor set given by Eq. (1). The following subsections
describe the game setup from the government and contractor perspectives, namely, DAA-
AWGE and KTR-AWGE, respectively.
7
FFP is also referred to Fixed Price Seal Bid (FPSB).
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6.1.1. DAA-AWGE game set-up
The KTRDAA-AWGE model simulates the government’s acquisition games from the govern-
ment perspective based on the “Contract Type” selected based on the PTB solution obtained
from DAA-PWGE models described in Section 5. The DAA-AWGE strategy is to map the
optimum “Type ith PTB Solution” (PTBi), obtained from DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE games
described in Section 5 above, to the optimum “Acquisition Strategy” and the associated “Type
ith Contract” (CTi). Denote the government strategy as SDAA, mathematically SDAA for Bayesian
games with complete and imperfect information can be written as:
SDAA ¼ SDAAi : PTBi !
pDAA
i
CTi; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(27)
where pDAAi is the government “Belief Function” describing the probability that the DAA will
map PTBi to CTi. It is defined as follows:
PDAA ¼ p
DAA
i ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(28)
Each pDAAi must satisfy the following conditions:
0 ≤pDAAi ≤ 1 and
XN
i¼1
pDAAi ¼ 1 (29)
The DAA utility function UDAA is defined as:
UDAA ¼ UDAA_i : SDAAi !
pDAA
i
PCFDAAi ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(30)
where PCFDAAi is the government “Payoff and Cost Function” (PCF) associated with the
selection of the ith strategy SDAAi. If PCF is the government estimated “contractor cost” associ-
ated with the space system being acquired (PCFDAA_KTRi), the “Nash strategy” dictates that the
optimum strategy for selecting the contract parameters is to minimize the PCF according to:
SDAAOpt ¼
Min
∀i
PCFDAA_KTRi
 
¼
Min
∀i
SDAAi !
pDAA
i
PCFDAA_KTRi ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(31)
If the government utility function UDAAi = 1 represents the optimum government saving strategy
expressed in Eq. (30), SDAAOpt, the following condition must be true according to Nash:
UDAA_KTRi¼1 ¼ SDAA1 !
pDAA
1
PCFDAA_KTRi¼1
 
< UDAA_KTRi¼2 < UDAA_KTRi¼3 < … < UDAA_KTRi¼N
(32)
If PCF is the government saving associatedwith the space systembeing acquired (PCFDAA_Savingi),
“Nash strategy” dictates that the optimumcontract parameters can be selected bymaximizing the
saving or PCF according to:
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SDAAOpt ¼
Min
∀i
PCFDAA_Savingi
n o
¼
Max
∀i
SDAAi !
pDAA
i
PCFDAA_Savingi ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(33)
If the government utility function UDAAi = 1 represents the optimum government saving strategy
expressed in Eq. (32), SDAAOpt, the following condition must be true according to Nash strategy:
UDAA_Savingi¼1 ¼ SDAA1 !
pDAA
1
PCFDAA_Saving1
 
> UDAA_Savingi¼2 > … > UDAA_Savingi¼N (34)
The DAA can play non-cooperative or cooperative games depending on the “Contract
Type.” For example, for the FFP contract type, the DAA plays non-cooperative games if the
DAA provides a clear direction on the FFP contract that the lowest bidder will be selected
and there is no negotiation between the government and the selected contractor. On the
contrary, the FPIF contract type requires the cooperation between DAA and the selected
contractor to agree on a set of sharing ratios, and perhaps on the Point of Total Assumption
(PTA) [12] as well.
6.1.2. KTR-AWGE game set-up
The KTR-AWGE model simulates the contractor’s bidding games from the contractor perspec-
tive based on the “Contract Type” and the associated contract parameters generated from the
DAA-AWGE games. Let bi be the bidding strategy for the i
th contractor, the contractor strategy
set for Bayesian game with complete and imperfect information, SKTR, is defined as:
SKTR ¼ SKTRi : KTRi !
pKTR
i
bi; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(35)
where pKTRi is the conditional probability that the i
th contractor selects the ith bidding strategy
given by:
PKTR ¼ p
KTR
i ; i ¼ 1; 2;…n
 
(36)
Xn
i¼1
pKTRi ¼ 1 (37)
The contractor utility function UKTR is defined as:
UKTR ¼ UKTRi : SKTRi !
pKTR
i
PCFKTRi ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(38)
where PCFKTRi is the contractor “Payoff and Cost Function” associated with the i
th contractor,
KTRi, who selects the i
th bidding strategy SDAAi. Since the PCFKTRi is the contractor cost
associated with the space system being acquired (PCFDAA_KTRi), “Nash strategy” dictates that
the optimum bidding parameters are selected by maximizing the contractor cost function
according to:
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SKTROpt ¼
Max
∀i
PCFKTRi
 
¼
Max
∀i
SKTRi !
pKTR
i
PCFKTRi ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(39)
If the contractor utility function UKTRi = 1 represents the optimum contractor profit strategy
expressed in Eq. (38), SKTROpt, the following condition must be true according to Nash strategy:
UKTRi¼1 ¼ SKTR1 !
pKTR1
PCFKTR1
 
> UKTRi¼2 > UKTRi¼3 > … > UKTRi¼N (40)
Note that the KTR-AWGE models always assume non-cooperative games since the contractors
do not share their bidding strategies among themselves.
6.2. Analytical and simulation modeling approach for government acquisition games:
DAA-AWGE
6.2.1. DAA-AWGE for FFP contract type
The DAA-AWGE game for FFP assumes that the PTB solution obtained from the DAA-PWGE
game model described in Section 5 is the “Type 1 PTB Solution” and the corresponding optimum
“Contract Type” is FFP (see Figure 5). The FFP game assumes that the contractor actual costs are
unknownwith a cost ranges of [Cmin,Cmax], and the actual cost has either an uniformdistribution or
a triangular distribution. For this game, from the government’s perspective, the higher is the
contractor’s bid, the lower is the probability of winning the contract. For optimum acquisition
strategy, the contractor needs to use the “Nash strategy” to maximize the expected profit taking
into considerationbothhis bid andother contractors’ ‘expectedbids. For non-optimumstrategy, the
contractor profit is selected by a random percentage over the target cost. The DAA strategy is to
minimize contractor profits by searching for a bidding solution that will increase the number of
bidders to at least twobidders for increased competition at theminimumpossible price. To simplify
themodeling effort, the government and the contractors are assumed to have the same risk.
For FFP, the DAA-AWGE game seeks the optimum contract parameters, including the opti-
mum fixed price PCopt. Thus, for FFP, the i
th contractor’s profit function PFKTRi is defined as:
PFKTRi ¼ Pc  ci; i ¼ 1; 2;…;Nf g (41)
wherePC is the fixed price and ci is the actual production cost of the i
th contractor. The government
payment is the fixed price PC. The DAA-AWGE game is to minimize PC. This section provides a
war-gamingmodel for deriving the optimumfixedpricePCopt_Gov, from the government perspective.
FromSection 5, the optimum strategy for selecting the FFP contract parameters is defined as:
SDAAOpt ¼
Min
∀i
PCFDAA_KTRi ¼ PFKTRn
 
¼
Min
∀i
SDAAi !
pDAA
i
Pc  cið Þ; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
 
(42)
From Eq. (17), the optimum government fixed price, PCopt_Gov , can be found by solving the
following optimization problem:
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PCopt_Gov ¼
Min
∀i
f PFKTRið g þ ci ¼
Min
∀i
bi  cif g þ ci for bi ≥ ci and i ¼ 1, 2,…N (43)
Note the actual production cost ci for the i
th contractor cannot be minimized. And b(ci) is the i
th
contractor bidding function given by [11]
b cið Þ ¼
bi, for bi ≥ ci
0, for bi < ci
 
(44)
Using calculus of variation approach, the optimum fixed price from the government perspec-
tive for uniform distribution can be shown to have the following form [9]:
PCopt_Gov ¼
Min
∀i
Cmax  ci
N
;
 
þ ci, for ci ∈ Cmin;Cmax½ , and i ¼ 1, 2,…N (45)
The expected contractor cost ci or the “Target Cost” TC can be determined from the cost
analysis using the cost “S-Curve” or using the expected value of the cost distribution. For
uniform case, the target cost is found to be [9]:
E cif g ¼ Tc ¼ Tc_Uni ¼ CMaxþCMinð Þ=2 (46)
The optimum fixed price from when the production cost ci has the triangular distributed over
[Cmin, m, Cmax] with m as the mode, can be shown to have the following form [9]:
PCopt_Gov ¼
Min
∀i
Aþ Bþ 2C½ 0:5
2N  1ð Þ
( )
þ ci, for Cmin < ci < m, and i ¼ 1, 2,…N
Min
∀i
cmax  cj
2N  1ð Þ
 
þ ci, for m < ci < Cmax, and i ¼ 1, 2,…N
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
(47)
where:
A ¼ N:Cmin  Nþ 1ð Þ:ci
B ¼ N:cmin þ N 1ð Þ:cið Þ
2
C ¼ N 1ð Þ þ 0:5ð Þ: ρ c2min  2 N 1ð Þ:ci:cmin
 
ρ ¼ Cmax  Cminð Þ: m Cminð Þ
8>><
>>>:
9>>=
>>>;
(48)
As point out in Ref. [9], the “Nash strategy” indicates that the optimum contractor profit is
determined by the maximum expected cost Cmax, contractor actual production cost ci, and the
number of contractors “N” participating in the bidding. Using the optimum “Nash strategy,”
an optimum bidder can make a smaller profit compared to the non-optimum bidders on a
specific bid; however, in the long run, the optimum bidder is expected to make more profit
than the non-optimum bidders since he wins more bids. The DAA-AWGE algorithm for FFP
Contract Type is shown in Figure 7.
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6.2.2. DAA-AWGE for CPIF contract type
This game assumes that the PTB solution obtained from the DAA-PWGE model described in
Section 5 above is the “Type 3 PTB Solution” and the corresponding optimum “Contract Type” is
CPIF (see Figure 5). Themodeling development approach for theDAA-AWGECPIF contract type
is identical to FPIF approach described in Ref. [9]. The model assumes that both the government
and the contractor will cooperate to maximize their minimum saving/profit. Therefore, their
bargaining objective will be the maximization of the minimum outcome of the saving/profit, i.e.,
the “maximum” value of the saving/profit. Let PCFGov and PCFKTRi be the final compromised
saving/profit points, and PCF0Gov and PCF
0
KTRi
be the benchmark saving/profit points for the nego-
tiation between the government and the ith contractor, respectively. The optimum CPIF contract
parameters can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem [9]:
Max
∀i
Fi : Fi ¼ PCFGov  PCF
0
Gov
 
: PCFKTRi  PCF
0
KTRi
 	
; i ¼ 1; 2;…N
n o
(49)
Note that PCFGov and PCFKTRi are also defined as the government’s “Cost Saving” and the i
th
contractor profit, respectively, and they are given by [9]:
PCFGov ¼ Cp þ SRGi Tc  ACi
 
 ACi þ PCFKTRi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…N (50)
PCFKTRi ¼ Tpi  Tc
 	
þ SRCi : Tc  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…N (51)
where SRGi is the government sharing ratio and Aci is the actual production cost for the i
th
contractor, which is unknown and as before, it is assumed to be either uniformly distributed
Figure 7. DAA-AWGE modeling and simulation approach for FFP contract type [9].
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over [Oc, Pc], or triangularly distributed over [Oc, Pc] with mode “m.” Substituting PCFKTRi into
PCFGov, the government’s “Cost Saving” in terms of the contract parameters can be obtained as:
PCFGov ¼ Cp þ 2: 1 SRCi
 
: Tc  ACi
 
 Tpi ; i ¼ 1, 2,…N (52)
Substituting Eq. (52) into Eq. (49), and using the calculus of variation approach, the optimiza-
tion problem can be solved by searching for the Sharing Ratios (SRs) that can maximize Fi and
then search for the optimum target price TP that can maximize Fi. For both DAA and KTR
games, we first maximize the cost function Fi with respect to the contractor sharing ratio, SRCi,
by solving the following equation:
∂Fi
∂SRCi
¼ 0, i ¼ 1, 2,…N (53)
Note that the contractor sharing ratio ranges from 0 to 1 and the government sharing ratio for
the ith contractor, SRGi, is defined as:
SRGi ¼ 1 SRCi (54)
For DAA-AWGE game from the DAA perspective, the optimization occurs with the following
partial differential equation with respect to the contractor:
∂Fi
∂PCFKTRi
¼ 0, i ¼ 1, 2,…N (55)
Note that for KTR-AWGE game from the contractor perspective, Eq. (52) becomes:
∂Fi
∂PCFGov
¼ 0 (56)
Solving Eq. (50) and Eq. (52), the optimum win-win sharing ratio, SRC_Opti, and optimum win-
win target price, TPOpti , from the DAA perspective are found as follow [9]:
SRC_Opti ¼
2 PCF0KTRi  PCF
0
Gov  3Tp  4TC
 
þ Cp  2ACi
 
4: Tc  ACi
  , i ¼ 1, 2,…N (57)
TpOpt i
¼ 2ACi  CP
 
þ PCF0Gov þ 2PCF
0
KTRi
h i
; i ¼ 1, 2,…N (58)
For CPIF, the optimum contract parameters depend on whether the contract is the under-run
or over-run case. The under-run case occurs when the actual cost of the ith contractor is less
than or equal to target cost, i.e., ACi ≤Tc. The over-run case occurs when ACi >Tc.
• Case 1: Under-run case: ACi ≤Tc
For this case, the benchmark saving/profit points for the negotiation between the government
and the ith contractor become:
PCF0Gov ¼ ∝ Tc  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (59)
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PCF0KTRi ¼ Cp  Tc
 
(60)
Substituting Eqs. (59) and (60) into Eqs. (57) and (57), we obtain the optimum target price,8
TpUOpti, and the optimum win-win contractor sharing ratio, SRCUOpti, for the under-run case:
TpUOpt i
¼ CP  1:5SRCUi : Tc  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…, n (61)
SRCUOpt i ¼
2 2 ∝ð Þ
3
, 1=2ð Þ ≤ ∝ ≤ 2, ∀i (62)
Using the optimumTPUOpti andSRCUOpt i , the optimumgovernmentpayment can be calculated from:
PGovUOptCPIF ¼ ACi þ TpUOpti
 Tc
 	
þ SRCUOpti : Tc  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (63)
The parameter α in Eq. (59) will be selected to minimize the government payment.
• Case 2: Over-run case: ACi >Tc
For this case, the benchmark saving/profit points for the negotiation between the government and
the ith contractor become:
PCF0Gov ¼ 0 (64)
PCF0KTRi ¼ β Cp  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (65)
Substituting Eqs. (64) and (65) into Eqs. (57) and (58) above, we obtain the optimum target
price,9 TpOOpti, and the optimum win-win contractor sharing ratio, SRCOOpti for the over-run
case:
TpOOpti
¼ CP  1:5: 1 SRCOið Þ: ACi  Tcð Þ; i ¼ 1, 2,…,n (66)
SRCOOpt i ¼ 1
4
3
1 β
 
CP ACið Þ
ACi  Tcð Þ
, 1
3
4
ACi  Tcð Þ
CP ACið Þ

 
≤β ≤ 1; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (67)
Using the optimum TpOOpti and SRCOOpti, the optimum government payment can be calculated
from the following equation:
PGovOOptCPIF ¼ ACi þ TpOOpti
 Tc
 	
þ SRCOOpt i : Tc ACið Þ; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (68)
The parameter β in Eq. (65) will be selected to minimize the government payment. The
optimum target price depends on the ceiling price, contractor sharing ratio, target cost and
8
Note that the optimum target price expressed in Eq. (47) indicates the optimum target price that is acceptable to
Government when the optimum value of α, αOpt, is selected based on the minimum Government payment.
9
This is the optimum target price that the contractor is seeking by selecting the optimum value of β based on the
maximum contractor profit.
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actual cost of the ith contractor. Figure 8 describes the DAA-AWGE-CPIF Monte Carlo
simulation approach to determine the optimum target price, sharing ratios, and government
payment under government’s perspective.
As indicated in Figure 8, the output of the DAA-AWGE CPIF model includes the average
optimum values of the target fee (FT_ave), minimum fee (Fmin_ave) and maximum fee (Fmax_ave),
assuming there will be N optimum values for all of the selected contractors by the end of the
games. The calculation of these optimum values are derived from Ref. [12] and given by the
following formulas:
FT_ave ¼
XN
i¼1
TpUOpt i
 TC
 	
N
(69)
Fmin_ave i ¼
XN
i¼1
FT_ave  SRCOOpt i Pc  Tcð Þ
 	
N
(70)
Fmax_ave ¼
XN
i¼1
SRCUOpt i Tc Ocð Þ þ FT_ave
 	
N
(71)
where TPUOpt i , SRCOOpti and SRCUOpt i are defined as above. The estimate costs Oc, Tc and Pc are the
optimistic cost estimate, target cost estimate and pessimistic cost estimate are given by the cost
estimate group from engineering department or finance department or contract department
depending on the organization and game rules.
Figure 8. DAA-AWGE modeling and simulation approach for CPIF contract type.
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6.3. Analytical and simulation modeling approach for contractor bidding games:
KTR-AWGE
6.3.1. KTR-AWGE for FFP contract type
The contractor bidding game, KTR-AWGE, follows the setup described in Section 6.1.2 and [9].
Similar to DAA-AWGE model for FFP, the PTB solution obtained from the KTR-PWGE game
model is the “Type 1 Requirement” and the corresponding optimum “Contract Type” is FFP.
For FFP, the KTR-AWGE game seeks the optimum contract parameters, including the opti-
mum fixed price PCopt, that maximizes the contractor’s profit PCFKTRi [9]:
SKTROpti ¼
Max
∀i
PCFKTRif g, for i ¼ 1, 2,…N (72)
where contractor profit function, PCFKTRi, is defined as:
PCFKTRi ¼
bi cið Þ  ci, if bi ¼ min b1;…; bnð Þ, and bi > ci
1=Nð Þ: bi cið Þ  ci½ , if bi ¼ bj,…, bN, and bi > ci
0, if bi > min b1;…; bnð Þ
8><
>:
9>=
>; (73)
where N, bi(ci) and ci are defined in the above sections as the number of contractors, bidding
price and associated actual production cost of the ith contractor, respectively. Using the calcu-
lus of variation approach and assuming the cost to be uniformly distributed between [Cmin,
Cmax ], the solution to Eq. (72) is the optimum bidding price, bUnif_Opti, from the contractor
perspective has the same form as that from the government perspective, i.e.,
bUnif_Opti ¼
Max
∀i
Cmax  ci
N
;
 
þ ci, for ci ∈ Cmin;Cmax½ , and i ¼ 1, 2,…N (74)
For the triangular distribution case, the optimum bidding price from the contractor perspective
can be found in Ref. [9]. The KTR-AWGE model shows that, using the “Nash strategy,” the
optimum contractor bidding price is also dependent on the maximum expected cost Cmax,
the contractor actual production cost, ci, and the number of contractors “N” participating in the
bidding. The model shows that a contractor’s bidding strategy is optimum when it maximizes
his profit based on the maximum expected cost, the actual cost and the number of bidders. The
modeling and simulation approach proposed for the FFP KTR-AWGE is to combine the above
analytical models with Monte Carlo simulation. The flow chart for FFP KTR-AWGE approach is
very similar to FFP DAA-AWGE and can be found in Ref. [9].
6.3.2. KTR-AWGE for CPIF contract type
The CPIF KTR-AWGE game described in this section follows [9]. It assumes that the PTB
solution obtained from the KTR-PWGE game model is “Type 3 Requirement” and the
corresponding optimum “Contract Type” is CPIF. The objective of the KTR-AWGE model is
to seek the optimum “bidding” target price and the associated contractor sharing ratios for
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maximum contractor profit, i.e., maximum benefit from the contractor perspective. Rewrite
PCFKTRi (Eq. (50)) as a function of PCFGov as follow:
PCFKTRi ¼ Cp þ SRGi Tc ACið Þ  ACi þ PCFGovð Þ; i ¼ 1, 2,…N (75)
The optimization problem shown in Eq. (49) becomes [9]:
Max
∀i
Fi ¼ PCFGovi  PCF
0
Govi
 	
: Cp þ SRGi
 
Tc ACið Þ
n
ACi  PCFGovi  PCF
0
KTRi
o
, i ¼ 1, 2,…N (76)
where PCFGovi, PCF
0
Govi
, Cp, SRGi, Tc, ACi and PCF
0
KTRi
are as defined in Section 6.2 above.
Again, using the calculus of variation approach described in Eq. (56), the optimum “bidding”
target price, TpOpt i
is found to be [9]:
TpKOpti
¼ 2ACi  CPð Þ þ 2 PCF
0
KTRi
þ 0:5PCF0Gov
h 	
; i ¼ 1, 2,…N (77)
Note that for the KTR-AWGE game, the optimum win-win sharing ratio from the contractor
perspective, SRCOpt i , is identical to the DAA perspective, which is shown to have the form
expressed in Eq. (57). As discussed earlier, the optimum contract parameters depend on the
whether the contractor is under-run or over-run. The following paragraphs describe the
approach to determine the optimum sharing ratios and the target price from the contractor
perspective.
• Case 1: Under-run case: ACi ≤Tc
For this case, we set α = 2 and the benchmark saving/profit points for the negotiation between
the government and the ith contractor become [9]:
PCF0Gov ¼ 2 Tc  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (78)
PCF0KTRi ¼ Cp  Tc
 
(79)
From the contractor’s perspective, when α = 2 the optimum contractor sharing ratio, SRCUKOpti ,
is 0% (see Eq. (62)) and the government takes 100% responsibility to pay off the profit when the
contractor is under-run. The optimum bidding target price, TPKUOpt i , for this given by [9]:
TpKUOpti
¼ CP; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (80)
From the contractor perspective, the optimum price is the ceiling price. Using the optimum
bidding target price TPKUOpt i and sharing ratio SRCUKOpt i , the optimum government payment can
be calculated from the following Eq. [9]:
PGovUOptCPIF ¼ ACi þ CP  Tcð Þ; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (81)
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• Case 2: Over-run case: ACi >Tc
For this case, we set β = 1 and the benchmark saving/profit points for the negotiation between
the government and the ith contractor become [9]:
PCF0Gov ¼ 0 (82)
PCF0KTRi ¼ Cp  ACi
 
; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (83)
The optimum bidding target price for the over-run case, TPOOpti , is found to be [9]:
TpKOOpti
¼ CP; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (84)
Again, from the contractor perspective, the optimum price is the ceiling price. Similarly, the
optimum sharing ratio, SRC_OKOpti, for the over-run case is given by [9]:
SRCOKOpt i ¼ 1, i ¼ 1, 2,…n (85)
This means the contractor takes 100% responsibility when it is over-run! Using the optimum
bidding target price TPKOOpti and contractor sharing ratio SRC_OKOpti, the government payment
is given by [9]:
PGovOKOptCPIF ¼ CP; i ¼ 1, 2,…n (86)
The modeling and simulation approach for CPIF KTR-AWGE is found to be similar to FPIF
KTR-AWGE with the new optimum bidding target prices, TPUOpt i and TPOOpt i , and contractor
sharing ratios, SRCUOpt i and SRCOOpt i , described above. The flow chart for CPIF KTR-AWGE
approach is very similar to CPIF DAA-AWGE and is shown in Figure 8.
7. Simulation results for sample PTB solutions and commonly used
contract types
Contributors: Brittany Dyer, Claire Goldhammer, Daniel Chertock and Scott Mahan
The models discussed in this chapter to evaluate PTB solutions and associated acquisition
strategies for acquiring future space systems were implemented in MATLAB. The simulation
results shown in this section were obtained by the 2017 REU team. In particular, we will
present simulation results associated with the CPIF model for acquisition strategy. Simulation
results associated with FFP contract type can be found in Ref. [13].
7.1. PTB-WGE mixed game model simulation results
The above PTB-WGE models are implemented in MATLAB. The inputs for the PTB-WGE
models, which include market survey results and for risk information, potential architecture
solutions describing technology combinations, and the PCF information, are manually input
into the PTB-WGE program using the input dialog function in MATLAB. The belief function is
calculated in a Monte Carlo simulation and aggregates individual technology risk information
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into a risk assessment for the architecture solution as a whole. The risk and PCF assessments
are then combined to form a metric, which is used to select the optimal KTR and contract type
using the PTB-ARCS mapping rules shown in Figure 5. Examples of the inputs to DAA-PWGE
model are shown in Figures 9–11.
Figure 9. Example of the PCF score for contractor #1 with architecture solution #1 (ARCS #1).
Figure 10. An example of warfighter needs and architecture solution set.
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Figure 9 shows an example of the PCF score assigned for contractor #1 with ARCS #1. If the
architecture solution set consists of 6 architecture solutions (ARCS’s) as shown in Figure 10,
there will be 6 PCF score sheets for each contractor. This example assumes 4 contractors, hence
there will be 24-PCF score sheets input to the DAA-PWGE model. Figure 11 shows an example
of the market survey results for four contractors or suppliers.
Example output of the DAA-PWGE program for mixed game model, including the optimum
supplier, ARCS, and associated risk, is shown in Figure 12.
7.2. DAA-AWGE CPIF model simulation results
To average out the randomness in the optimal solutions, the acquisition and bidding models
were iterated several thousand times. The CPIF program outputs the average value for each
optimal contract parameter, as well as average government payment, the fee adjustment
formula, and average initial conditions PCF0
G
and PCF0
Ki
. Here, we present simulation results
Figure 11. An example of market survey results for DAA-PWGE mixed game model.
Figure 12. PTB program output example.
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of four contractors and three optimal bidders. Among the optimal bidders, the limits for
the randomly generated control parameters α and β are adjusted to model different bid-
ding behavior. In this simulation, we treat contractor one as the “average” bidder. The
limits for contractor two are changed so that this contractor tends to select unfavorable
sharing ratios from the DAA perspective; hence, contractor two is “non-cooperative.” On
the other hand, contractor three tends to select sharing ratios favorable to the DAA and is
called the “cooperative” bidder. The precise limits for these control parameters are
depicted in Figure 13.
Figures 14 and 15 show the Graphical User Interface (GUI) for DAA-AWGE CPIF input
parameters and program output, respectively. The simulation results depicting average
government payments and savings as well as sharing rations are shown in Figures 16–18.
Contract three, the “cooperative” bidder, gives the DAAmore savings than the other optimal
bidders despite receiving more profit (see Figure 19). Hence, it can benefit the contractor to
select the sharing ratio that benefits the DAA, both in terms of profit per contract and total
long-run profit.
Figure 19 shows a stark difference between the profit earned by optimal bidders and that
earned by the non-optimal bidder. Figure 19(a) depicts that contractor four chooses contract
Figure 13. DAA-AWGE CPIF optimal bidder α and β limits.
Figure 14. DAA-AWGE CPIF input.
War-Gaming Applications for Achieving Optimum Acquisition of Future Space Systems
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.71044
215
Figure 15. DAA-AWGE CPIF output.
Figure 16. DAA-AWGE CPIF average government payments.
Figure 17. DAA-AWGE CPIF average government savings.
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parameters aggressively; the non-optimal bidding strategy demands more profit per con-
tract but wins far less often, as shown in Figure 19(c). Figure 19(b) shows that in the long
run, the optimal bidders receive more total profit because of their higher winning percent-
ages. Contractor four, the non-optimal bidder, would benefit from using the Nash equilib-
rium bidding strategy rather than aiming for a fixed profit rate. Changing the control
parameter limits for the optimal bidders also affects long-run profit. Note that the “cooper-
ative” contractor three demand more profit per contract than the other optimal bidders in
Figure 19(a) but wins more contracts according to Figure 19(c). This result is feasible because
the DAA and contractors are not playing a zero-sum game, that is, PCFG and PCFK
i
do not
sum to zero.
Figure 18. DAA-AWGE CPIF average sharing ratios.
Figure 19. KTR-AWGE CPIF simulation results. (a) Profit per contract; (b) total profit; and (c) winning percentages.
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8. Integration of PWGEs and AWGEs
The objective for the development of DAA-PWGE, DAA-AWGE, KTR-PWGE and KTR-
AWGE analytical and simulation models is to assist the DAA to understand the contractor’s
perspective and to seek optimum PTB solution and corresponding acquisition strategy under
both Government’s and contractor’s perspectives. Thus, the government PTB solution for a
given set of “requirements” should be optimized to achieve government saving and at the
same time to have more than one contractor bidding the solution. This means that there will be
at least two contractors converge to the same Government’s PTB solution with similar market
and technology risks as predicted by the DAA-PWGE. And, the contract type and associated
contract parameters and incentives are derived based on the compromised results obtained
from both DAA-AWGE and KTR-AGWE. In another word, the PTB solution will be obtained
from the integrated DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE. The final acquisition strategy for acquiring
the PTB solution obtained from the integrated DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE is to be generated
from the integrated DAA-AWGE and KTR-AWGE. As presented in the proposed UGAF
shown in Figure 3, the selection of PTB solution and acquisition strategy is a close-loop process
and the PTB solution and associated contract type are converge to a single PTB solution with
more than one contractor is willing to bid on it. As mention in Section 5, the PTB solution is
selected based on the highest PCF score with an assigned “belief” score (or probability). The
integrated DAA-PWGE and KTR-PWGE algorithm searches for the highest PCF score and
assigned “belief” score that both DAA and KTR can converge to these scores. It is straight
Figure 20. PTB War-Gaming Engines integration algorithm.
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forward when the KTR’s PCF and “belief” scores converge to DAA’s scores. However, when
the convergence is not a clear-cut case, a Decision Support Algorithm (DSA) is required to
select the optimum PTB solution that can satisfy multiple criteria, including requirements,
risks and cost. Our team is currently working on the development of a DSA that leveraged
the work done presented in [14–18].
Figures 20 and 21 describe the integration algorithm for integrating DAA-AWGE and KTR-
AWGE. The integrated DAA-AWGE and KTR-AWGE algorithm searches for the right “balance”
between the DAA’s acquisition strategy and KTR’s bidding strategy. Our team is currently
investigating advanced decision support algorithms that incorporated supervised learning and
artificial intelligence to achieve a balance between DAA’s and government’s perspectives in
terms of the government saving and contractor profit, which leads to an estimate the “Expected
KTR Profit and Incentives.” The “KTR Profit and Incentives” should be compromised with the
Government Target Price and associated Target Profit and sharing ratios.
9. Conclusion and way-forward
This chapter provides an overview of the description of PTB optimization games and
acquisition-bidding games from both the government and the contractor perspectives. It pre-
sents the DAA-PWGE, DAA-AWGE, KTR-PWGE and KTR-AWGE analytical and simulation
models. It also provides flow diagrams to show the combination of these models with the
Figure 21. Acquisition-bidding War-Gaming Engines integration algorithm.
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Monte Carlo simulation to generate (i) optimum PTB solutions that can achieve affordability
from government perspective, and (ii) optimum FFP and FPIF contract parameters that
can achieve affordability from the government’s affordability perspective and maximum
profit from the contractor perspective. The models were implemented in a collection of MAT-
LAB packages.
Simulation results reveal how contractor behavior affects contractor profit. They show that
non-optimal bidders demand more profit per contract which results in a lower winning
percentage and less total profit in the long run. Therefore, it is beneficial for contractors to
implement the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. In addition, the CPIF model further sepa-
rates optimal bidders into cooperative, average, and non-cooperative strategies. The analysis
shows that contractors can select a less profitable sharing ratio and in turn increase their long
run total profit by cooperating with the government. The resulting information can serve as
DAA negotiation tools to encourage cooperative bidding in order to increase government
savings. The chapter also discusses the integration of contract parameters from the govern-
ment and contractor perspectives to generate a set of optimum contract parameters that can
achieve the “Increased in Competition.” The discussion is at high-level and the subject on the
selection of the optimum target price and contractor sharing ratios for the FPIF/CPIF contract
types to meet the “Increased in Competition” criterion and the application of supervised
learning and artificial intelligence to improve the decision-making process deserve more atten-
tion for the future research.
The purpose of the unified framework is to set-up a multi-stakeholder acquisition strategy
that encourage cooperative bidding leading to a win-win Nash equilibrium. In such a
framework, we seek to change the perspectives of the players from antagonistic to collabo-
rative. Since the simulation results show encouraging evidence that our unified war-gaming
framework could help achieve the objective of DII, one of our future research directions is
to look into the design of a distributed group decision and negotiation systems that would
provide an seamless integration of various acquisition models in such a way that an
global optimum solution can be found without negatively affecting local solutions. More
importantly, the ultimate goal is to fine-tune our generalized model to help involved
parties continuously explore new innovative solutions to meet war fighting needs of the
digital age.
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